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                                   ANNOTATION
             SUPREME COURT'S VIEWS AS TO CIVIL LIABILITY OF JUDGES

                                55 L. Ed. 2d 850

TOTAL CLIENT-SERVICE LIBRARY(R) REFERENCES

15 Am Jur 2d, Civil Rights @ 269; 46 Am Jur 2d, Judges @@ 72 et
seq. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Form 123 42
USCS @ 1983
US L Ed Digest, Civil Rights @ 12.5; Judges @@ 14 et seq.
ALR Digests, Civil Rights @ 1.3; Judges @@ 32 et seq.
L Ed Index to Annos, Judges
ALR Quick Index, Judges
Federal Quick Index, Immunity from Prosecution; Judges


                              --------------------

CONTENTS:

   To view a section or subsection, transmit p* and its number.
Ex.,p*1 or p*1a    To view the Table-of-Cases, transmit p*cases
   To view the Index (where available), transmit p*index



@ 1. Introduction
       [a] Scope
       [b] Related matters
@ 2. Summary
@ 3. Judges of courts of general or superior jurisdiction
       [a] immunity for acts not done in "clear absence" of all
        jurisdiction over subject matter
       [b] --Effect of malice or corruption
@ 4. Judges of courts of limited or inferior jurisdiction
@ 5. Requirement of "judicial" act for immunity
@ 6. Effect of Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 USCS @ 1983)
@ 7. Liability in particular cases


[*1]   Introduction

[*1a]   Scope

   This annotation collects and analyzes decisions of the United
States Supreme Court in which the court has considered when, and to
what extent, a judge n1 is subject to civil liability because of
acts performed in his status as a judge.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

                                                                     PAGE    3                              55 L. Ed. 2d 850, *1a


   n1 For purposes of the annotation a "judge" is a public officer
who conducts or presides over a court of justice.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[*1b]   Related matters

   Supreme Court's construction of Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42
USCS @ 1983) providing private right of action for violation of
federal rights. 43 L Ed 2d 833.

   Liability in damages under 8 USCS @ 47 for conspiring to deprive
a person of his civil rights. 95 L Ed 1261.

   Civil liability of judicial officer for malicious prosecution or
abuse of   process.  64 ALR3d 1251.

   Allowance of damages to successful plaintiff or relator in
mandamus.  73 ALR2d 903.

   Libel and slander: findings, report, or the like of judge or
person acting in judicial capacity as privileged. 42 ALR2d 825.

--SUPP--

   When is prosecutor entitled to absolute immunity from civil suit
for damages under 42 USCS @ 1983: post-Imbler cases. 67 ALR Fed
640.

   Civil liability of witness in action under 42 USCS @ 1983 for
deprivation of civil rights, based on testimony given at pretrial
criminal proceeding. 94 ALR Fed 892.

   Manner or extent of trial judge's examination of witnesses in
civil cases. 6 ALR4th 951.

   Applicability of judicial immunity to acts of clerk of court
under state law. 34 ALR4th 1186.

   Sowle, Qualified immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unresolved
Issues of the Conditions for its Use and the Burden of Persuasion.
55 Tulane L Rev 326, February, 1981.

   Auto-Cite(R): Cases and annotations referred to herein can be
further researched through the Auto-Cite(R) computer-assisted
research service. Use Auto-Cite to check citations for form,
parallel references, prior and later history, and annotation
references.


 [*2]   Summary

   The general rule of common law, which the Supreme Court early
recognized, is that judicial officers in general are not subject to
civil liability for judicial acts done within their jurisdiction (@
3[a], infra). In the several decisions of the Supreme Court
involving a judge's immunity from civil liability on the basis of
his status as a judge, the Supreme Court has drawn a distinction
between judges of courts of general or superior jurisdiction and
those who are

    PAGE    4                               55 L. Ed. 2d 850, *2

judges of limited or inferior authority.

   The court has often recognized that judges of courts of general
or superior jurisdiction are not subject to liability in a civil
action for judicial acts, even if done in excess of jurisdiction,
so long as such judges have not acted in the clear absence of all
jurisdiction over the subject matter (@ 3[a], infra). Moreover, the
court has clearly settled that the rule as to judges of courts of
general jurisdiction is not subject to a qualification which would
abrogate immunity in instances where a judge acted maliciously or
corruptly (@ 3[b], infra).

   With respect to judges of courts of limited or inferior
jurisdiction, on the other hand, the Supreme Court has indicated
that judges of such authority are immunized from civil liability
for their judicial conduct only when they act within their
jurisdiction (@ 4, infra).

   Whether under the rule for judges of courts of general
jurisdiction or under the rule for judges of courts of limited
authority, a judge, in order to be entitled to immunity from civil
liability must have acted in a "judicial" capacity (@ 5, infra);
and, in regard to such "judicial" act requirement the court has
indicated that the factors to be taken into account are twofold,
involving consideration of, first, the nature of the act itself,
and, second, the expectation of the parties (@ 5, infra).

   Of further note in regard to the immunity of judges from civil
liability is the Supreme Court's holding that the judicial immunity
principle is fully applicable in actions under @ 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 (42 USCS @ 1983), which makes liable "every
person" who, under color of state law, deprives another person of
his civil rights.

   Thus far, in the several decisions in which it has determined
the question of the immunity of particular judges from civil
liability, the Supreme Court has found that under the facts and
circumstances presented in those cases, which cases have involved
actions against judges arising out of such matters as a judge's
disbarment of an attorney and a judge's ordering sterilization of
a minor, judges were immune from civil suits.
[*3]   Judges of courts of general or superior jurisdiction
[*3a]   immunity for acts not done in "clear absence" of all
jurisdiction over subject matter

   That judicial officers in general are not subject to civil
liability for judicial acts done within their jurisdiction was
recognized by the Supreme Court long ago, n2 and such rule, which
is the common-law rule, n3 remains viable as a general statement of
law. Regarding judges of courts of general or superior
jurisdiction, however, the court has subscribed to a broad rule of
judicial immunity, recognizing that such a judge is not subject to
liability in a civil action for his judicial acts, even if they are
in excess of his jurisdiction, so long as he has not acted in the
clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter. Randall
v Brigham (1869) 74 US 523, 19 L Ed 285; Bradley v Fisher (1872) 80
US 335, 20 L Ed 646; Spalding v Vilas (1896) 161 US 483, 40 L Ed
780, 16 S Ct 631; Alzua v Johnson (1913) 231 US 106, 58 L Ed 142,
34 S Ct 27; Pierson v Ray (1967) 386 US 547, 18 L Ed 2d 288, 87 S
Ct 1213; Stump v Sparkman (1978) 435 US 349, 55 L Ed 2d 331, 98 S
Ct 1099, reh den (US) 56 L Ed 2d 795,

 PAGE    5      55 L. Ed. 2d 850, *3a  98 S Ct 2862.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
   n2 Wilkes v Dinsman (1849) 48 US 89, 12 L Ed 618; Randall v
Brigham (1869) 74 US 523, 19 L Ed 285.

   n3 Pierson v Ray (1967) 386 US 547, 18 L Ed 2d 288, 87 S Ct
1213; Imbler v Pachtman (1976) 424 US 409, 47 L Ed 2d 128, 96 S Ct
984.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
   Thus, in Bradley v Fisher (1872) 80 US 335, 20 L Ed 646, the
Supreme Court, observing that it is a general principle of the
highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a
judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall
be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of
personal consequence to himself, noted that judges of courts of
superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions
for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their
jurisdiction. After explaining that such principle obtains in all
countries where there is any well-ordered system of jurisprudence,
that it has been the settled doctrine of the English courts for
many centuries, and that it has never been denied in the courts of
the United States, the court emphasized that the immunity granted
to judges is not without limit, there being a distinction between
acts done in excess of jurisdiction and acts performed in the clear
absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter. Specifically,
the court pointed out that where there is clearly no jurisdiction
over the subject-matter, any authority exercised is a usurped
authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the want ofjurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible, but
that where jurisdiction over the subject-matter is invested by law
in the judge, or in the court which he holds, the manner and extent
to which the jurisdiction shall be exercised are generally as much
questions for his determination as any other questions involved in
the case, although upon the correctness of his determination in
these particulars the validity of his judgments may depend. By way
of illustration, the court stated that if a probate court, invested
only with authority over wills and the settlement of estates of
deceased persons, should proceed to try parties for public
offenses, jurisdiction over the subject of offenses being entirely
wanting in the court, and this being necessarily known to its
judge, his commission would afford no protection to him in the
exercise of the usurped authority, but if, on the other hand, a
judge of a criminal court, invested with general criminal
jurisdiction over offenses committed within a certain district,
should hold a particular act to be a public offense, which is not
by the law made an offense, and proceed to the arrest and trial of
a party charged with such act, or should sentence a party convicted
to a greater punishment than that authorized by the law upon its
proper construction, no personal civil liability for such acts
would attach to the judge, although those acts would be in excess
of his jurisdiction. The court said that some of the most difficult
and embarrassing questions which a judicial officer is called upon
to consider and determine relate to his jurisdiction, or the manner
in which the jurisdiction shall be exercised, and that the same
principle of exemption from liability which obtains for errors
committed in the ordinary prosecution of a suit, where there is
jurisdiction of both subject and person, applies in cases of this
kind, and for the same reasons.

    PAGE    6                              55 L. Ed. 2d 850, *3a

   And noting that courts of superior or general jurisdiction are
not liable in civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such
acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, in Stump v Sparkman
(1978) 435 US 349, 55 L Ed 2d 331, 98 S Ct 1099, reh den (US) 56 L
Ed 2d 795, 98 S Ct 2862, the Supreme Court explained that the
necessary inquiry in determining whether a judge of such a court is
immune from suit is whether at the time he took the challenged
action he had jurisdiction over the subject matter before him.
Saying that the scope of the judge's jurisdiction must be construed
broadly where the issue is immunity from suit, the court explained
that the judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action
he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his
authority, but will be subject to liability only when he has acted
in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. It was added that a judge
of superior or general authority is absolutely immune from
liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority
is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.



 --SUPP--

   Judicial immunity from suits for money damages can be overcome
in only two sets of circumstances, one of which is that judge is
not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in
complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles v Waco (1991, US) 116
L Ed 2d 9, 112 S Ct 286.

[*3b]   --Effect of malice or corruption

   Although it was indicated in an early Supreme Court decision
that the rule immunizing judges of courts of general or superior
jurisdiction from civil liability for their judicial acts is
subject to the possible qualification that the judge must not have
acted maliciously or corruptly, the court has since expressly
repudiated this language, and in the following cases recognized
that the rule of judicial immunity prevails even when malice or
corruption is alleged. Bradley v Fisher (1872) 80 US 335, 20 L Ed
646; Spalding v Vilas (1896) 161 US 483, 40 L Ed 780, 16 S Ct 631;
Alzua v Johnson (1913) 231 US 106, 58 L Ed 142, 34 S Ct 27; Pierson
v Ray (1967) 386 US 547, 18 L Ed 2d 288, 87 S Ct 1213; Stump v
Sparkman (1978) 435 US 349, 55 L Ed 2d 331, 98 S Ct 1099, reh den
(US) 56 L Ed 2d 795, 98 S Ct 2862.

   Thus, although it had been stated in Randall v Brigham (1869) 74
US 523, 19 L Ed 285, that judges of superior or general authority
are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when
such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, "unless, perhaps,
when done maliciously or corruptly," the court in Bradley v Fisher
(1872) 80 US 335, 20 L Ed 646, concluded that the quoted qualifying
words were inserted only to insure that the rule was not phrased in
terms broader than necessary for the case under consideration, that
such qualifying words were not necessary to a correct statement of
the law, and that judges of courts of superior or general
jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial
acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction and
are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly. The court
said that the exemption of such judges from civil liability cannot
be affected by the motives with which their judicial acts are
performed, noting that allegations of malicious or corrupt motives
could always be made, and if motives could be inquired into, judges
would be subjected to vexatious litigation, whether the motives had
or had not any real existence. It was observed that against the
consequences of erroneous or irregular action by judges, from
whatever motives proceeding, the law has provided private parties

  PAGE    7                              55 L. Ed. 2d 850, *3b

with numerous remedies, such as proceedings for suspension or
removal, but that if civil actions could be maintained against a
judge because a losing party should see fit to allege that the acts
of the judge were done with partiality, or that they were done
maliciously or corruptly, the protection essential to judicial
independence would be entirely swept away.   In Pierson v Ray (1967) 386 US 547, 18 L Ed 2d 288, 87 S Ct
1213, the court observed that the immunity of judges from liability
for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction
applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and
corruptly, since the doctrine exists not for the protection or
benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the
public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty
to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of
consequences. It was said that a judge's errors may be corrected on
appeal, but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants
may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption.

   And it was said in Stump v Sparkman (1978) 435 US 349, 55 L Ed
2d 331, 98 S Ct 1099, reh den (US) 56 L Ed 2d 795, 98 S Ct 2862,
that judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not
liable in civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such
acts are in excess of their jurisdiction and are alleged to have
been done maliciously or corruptly. Since it is only when such a
judge has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction that he
loses this immunity, the court noted, a judge will not be subject
to liability simply because the action he took was in error or was
done maliciously.
--SUPP--

   Because judicial immunity from suits for money damages is
immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages,
such immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or
malice, existence of which cannot be resolved without engaging in
discovery or trial.  Mireles v Waco (1991, US) 116 L Ed 2d 9, 112
S Ct 286.

[*4]   Judges of courts of limited or inferior jurisdiction

   In contrast to the rule regarding judges of courts of general or
superior jurisdiction, discussed in @ 3[a], supra, the Supreme
Court has said that judges of limited and inferior authority are
immunized from civil liability for their judicial conduct only when
they act within their jurisdiction.

   Thus, although noting that judges of superior or general
authority are not subject to civil liability for their judicial
acts, even where those acts are in excess of their jurisdiction,
the court, in Randall v Brigham (1869) 74 US 523, 19 L Ed 285,
subscribed to a different rule with respect to judges of limited
and inferior authority, observing that such judges are protected
from civil liability "only when they act within their
jurisdiction."

   See also Alzua v Johnson (1913) 231 US 106, 58 L Ed 142, 34 S Ct
27, where, in rejecting the contention that a justice of the
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands should be held civilly
liable for rendering a false judgment, in view of the existence of
a statute insulating a "judge, justice of the peace, or assessor"
from civil liability only with respect to "any judicial action orjudgment rendered by him in good faith, and within the limits of
his legal powers and jurisdiction," the court observed that the
statute had in mind

  PAGE    8     55 L. Ed. 2d 850, *4

judges of inferior courts, "as to whom a different rule has been
held to prevail."

[*5]   Requirement of "judicial" act for immunity

   It has been recognized in virtually every decision discussed in
this annotation, expressly or by necessary implication, that in
order for a judge to possess any sort of immunity from civil
liability for his acts, the acts must be "judicial" in nature. In
the following decision, the court elaborated upon this requirement
of a "judicial" act.

   Thus, observing that it is only for acts performed in his
"judicial" capacity that a judge is immune from civil liability,
the court in Stump v Sparkman (1978) 435 US 349, 55 L Ed 2d 331, 98
S Ct 1099, reh den (US) 56 L Ed 2d 795, 98 S Ct 2862, explained
that the factors determining whether an act by a judge is a
"judicial" one relate first, to the nature of the act itself, that
is, whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and
second, to the expectations of the parties, that is, whether they
dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.

--SUPP--

   Because a state-court judge was acting in an administrative
capacity when he demoted and discharged a female probation officer,
the judge does not have absolute immunity from a damages suit,
under 42 USCS @ 1983, in which the former probation officer alleges
that the judge demoted and discharged her on account of her sex, in
violation of the equal protection clause of the Federal
Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, for (1) although the judge's
decisions at issue may have been important in providing the
necessary conditions of a sound judicial adjudicative system, the
decisions were not themselves judicial or adjudicative; (2) a judge
who hires or fires a probation officer cannot be meaningfully
distinguished from an executive branch official who is responsible
for making such employment decisions; (3) the alleged influence on
the quality of judicial decisions, by the threat of vexatious
lawsuits by disgruntled ex-employees, in no way serves to
distinguish judges from other public officials who hire and fire
subordinates, and does not create a great enough danger to justify
absolute immunity; and (4) it is not significant that, under the
state's law, only a judge can hire or fire probation officers, for
it would lift form over substance to conclude that, because the
judge acted within the scope of his authority, such employment
decisions are brought within the court's "jurisdiction," or
converted into "judicial acts." Forrester v White (1988, US) 98 L
Ed 2d 555, 108 S Ct 538.   With respect to allegations that an official act of a defendant
judge was the product of a corrupt conspiracy involving the bribery
of the judge, private parties who corruptly conspire with a judge
in connection with such conduct are acting under color of law, for
purposes of 42 USCS @ 1983; it is of no consequence in this respect
that the judge himself is immune from damages liability, for (1)
immunity does not change the character of the judge's action or
that of the judge's alleged coconspirators, and (2) the judge's
immunity is dependent upon the challenged conduct being an official
judicial act within the judge's statutory jurisdiction, broadly
construed. National Collegiate Athletic Asso. v Tarkanian (1988,
US) 102 L Ed 2d 469, 109 S Ct 454.

    PAGE    9                               55 L. Ed. 2d 850, *5

   Judicial immunity from suits for money damages can be overcome
in only two sets of circumstances, one of which is that judge is
not immune for nonjudicial actions, that is, for actions not taken
in judge's judicial capacity; judge will not be deprived of
immunity because action that judge took was in error or in excess
of authority; accordingly, relevant inquiry is into nature and
function of act, not act itself--that is, relevant inquiry is to
look to particular act's relation to general function normally
performed by judge; it is nature of act performed, not identity of
actor who performed it, that informs court's analysis of judicial
immunity.  Mireles v Waco (1991, US) 116 L Ed 2d 9, 112 S Ct 286.

[*6]   Effect of Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 USCS @ 1983)

   The Supreme Court has ruled that the rule of judicial immunity
is applicable in actions under @ 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871
(42 USCS @ 1983), which makes liable "every person" who, under
color of state law, deprives another person of his civil rights.

   Thus, in Pierson v Ray (1967) 386 US 547, 18 L Ed 2d 288, 87 S
Ct 1213, the court said that it did not believe that the settled
principle of law immunizing judges from liability for damages for
acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction was abolished by
42 USCS @ 1983, noting that the legislative record gave no clear
indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all common-law
immunities. Observing that it had previously held that the immunity
of legislators for acts within the legislative role was not
abolished, the court explained that the immunity of judges for acts
within the judicial role was equally well established, and that it
was to be presumed that Congress would have specifically so
provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine.

   To the same effect, as recognizing that the doctrine of judicial
immunity is applicable in suits under @ 1983, is Stump v Sparkman
(1978) 435 US 349, 55 L Ed 2d 331, 98 S Ct 1099, reh den (US) 56 L
Ed 2d 795, 98 S Ct 2862.
--SUPP--

   Virginia Supreme Court and its members was held subject to suit
under 42 USCS @ 1983 and to award of attorneys' fees under 42 USCS
@ 1988 in its enforcement capacity as to prohibition against
attorney advertising, but immune from suit and not subject to award
of fees in its legislative capacity of promulgating Code of
Professional Responsibility rule strictly prohibiting advertising
of attorneys. Supreme Court of Virginia v Consumers Union of United
States, Inc. (1980) 446 US 719, 64 L Ed 2d 641, 100 S Ct 1967.

   As also recognizing that doctrine of judicial immunity applies
to 42 USCS @ 1983 suit for money damages, see Mireles v Waco (1991,
US) 116 L Ed 2d 9, 112 S Ct 286.

[*7]   Liability in particular cases

   The Supreme Court has held that particular judges were immune
from civil liability because of their status as judges under the
facts and circumstances of the following cases.

   Explaining that judges of courts of superior or general
authority are not liable to civil action for their judicial acts,
even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court, in Randall v Brigham (1869)

 PAGE   10       55 L. Ed. 2d 850, *7

74 US 523, 19 L Ed 285, held that a justice of the Superior Court
of Massachusetts was immune from suit by an attorney who sued the
judge for the judge's allegedly wrongful removal of the attorney
from the Massachusetts bar. In support of its decision the Supreme
Court noted that the Superior Court of Massachusetts was a court of
general jurisdiction, empowered by statute to admit attorneys and
counselors to practice in the courts of the state, and to remove
them, "for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct," and
that both the admission and the removal of attorneys are judicial
acts.

   A justice of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia was
not liable to answer for damages in an action brought by an
attorney alleging that he had wrongfully been disbarred by the
justice, held the Supreme Court, in Bradley v Fisher (1872) 80 US
335, 20 L Ed 646. Explaining that the attorney--who had been
disbarred because of alleged threats of personal chastisement made
to the presiding justice of the criminal court of the district as
the justice was descending from the bench after a recess in a
criminal trial in which the attorney was a defense counsel--had
been removed from the rolls of the District's criminal court, not
from the bar of the District's Supreme Court, and elucidating the
rule of judicial immunity to be that a judge of a court of superior
or general authority is not liable in a civil action for judicial
acts within his jurisdiction, even when in excess of jurisdiction,
and notwithstanding allegations that the judge acted maliciously or
corruptly, the Supreme Court pointed out that the criminal court of
the district, as a court of general criminal jurisdiction, had thepower to strike the attorney's name from its rolls, and that
although the justice had erred in not citing the attorney, before
making an order striking the attorney's name, so that the attorney
could show cause why the order should not be made and could make an
explanation, defense, or apology, such erroneous manner in which
jurisdiction was exercised, although it might have affected the
validity of the act, did not make the justice's act any less a
judicial act.

   It was held, in Alzua v Johnson (1913) 231 US 106, 58 L Ed 142,
34 S Ct 27, that the doctrine of immunity of judges from suit
because of their judicial acts protected a justice of the Supreme
Court of the Philippine Islands against a suit to recover damages
upon the alleged grounds that, without jurisdiction, the judge
entered a judgment against the plaintiff contrary to an order of
the full court, made a false statement of fact in the opinion by
which the full court ratified the change, and inserted in the
opinion of the full court in a second suit various false
statements, including one attributing to the first judgment an
effect that it could not have in the circumstances--all with full
knowledge and intent to injure the plaintiff. Having noted various
difficulties as to the suit against the judge that were additional
to the question of immunity, among others, that the justices of the
Supreme Court of the Philippines had expressed the view that the
statements in the former opinions at issue were right and had
rejected the suggestion that they were deceived when they rendered
the judgments, the court stated that the immunity of the justice
from suit was the same as that of judges in the United States,
which was established beyond dispute. The court also rejected a
contention that the justice could be sued because of a statute
insulating a "judge, justice of the peace, or assessor" from civil
liability only with respect to "any judicial action or judgment
rendered by him in good faith, and within the limits of his legal
powers and jurisdiction," the court observing that the statute had
in mind judges of inferior courts, "as to whom a different rule has
been held to prevail."

    PAGE   11                               55 L. Ed. 2d 850, *7

   In Pierson v Ray (1967) 386 US 547, 18 L Ed 2d 288, 87 S Ct
1213, it was held that a Mississippi municipal police justice was
immune from liability in an action for damages brought against him
and others under the common law of false arrest and under @ 1 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 USCS @ 1983) by individuals whom
the judge had convicted of violating a state breach-of-peace
statute, such damage action having been brought when the
individuals, on appeal from the municipal judge's decision, had
been vindicated in regard to their convictions. Noting that the
rule of immunity of judges from liability for acts committed within
their judicial jurisdiction applies even when the judge is accused
of acting maliciously and corruptly, the court pointed out that the
record was barren of any proof or specific allegation that the
judge played any role other than to adjudge the individuals guilty
when their cases came before his court. Additionally, the courtfound that the rule of judicial immunity was not abolished by the
civil rights statute under which the judge had been sued.

   Also, in Stump v Sparkman (1978) 435 US 349, 55 L Ed 2d 331, 98
S Ct 1099, reh den (US) 56 L Ed 2d 795, 98 S Ct 2862, it was held
that a judge of the Circuit Court of DeKalb County, Indiana, a
court of general jurisdiction, who had approved a mother's petition
to have her "somewhat retarded" minor daughter sterilized, was
immune from damages liability when sued a few years later by the
daughter and her husband in a federal court action under 42 USCS @
1983. Observing that judges of courts of superior or general
jurisdiction are not liable in civil actions for their judicial
acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction and
are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly, the court
ruled that the judge was immune from damages liability under 42
USCS @ 1983, even if the approval of the sterilization petition was
in error, since in view of the state court's broad general
jurisdiction under state statutes, the judge had jurisdiction to
act on the petition and did not act in the clear absence of all
jurisdiction, there being no state statute or case law prohibiting
the state court from considering sterilization petitions presented
by the parents of minors, and neither any procedural errors which
the judge might have committed nor the lack of a special statute
which authorized his approval of the sterilization petition
rendering him liable in damages. Moreover, the court determined
that the judge's approval of the sterilization petition was a
"judicial" act entitling him to immunity from liability, since even
though the petition had not been given a docket number, had not
been placed on file with the clerk's office, and had been approved
in an ex parte proceeding without notice to the minor, without a
hearing, and without the appointment of a guardian ad litem,
nevertheless (1) the judge had performed the type of act normally
performed only by judges, (2) he had acted in his capacity as a
judge, and (3) it was only because of his position as a judge that
the mother, on the advice of counsel, had submitted the petition to
him for his approval, the informality with which the judge had
proceeded not rendering his action nonjudicial so as to deprive him
of his absolute immunity.

--SUPP--

   Even if county public defender's allegations are taken as true--that (1) after public defender failed to appear for initial call of
state judge's morning calendar, judge ordered two police officers
to seize public defender forcibly and with excessive force and to
bring him into judge's courtroom, (2) officers, by means of
unreasonable force and violence, removed public defender from
another courtroom and brought him into judge's courtroom, and (3)
judge knowingly approved and ratified each of offciers' acts--judge
is immune from 42 USCS @ 1983 suit for money damages, because (1)
judge's alleged actions were


                                                                      PAGE   12                               55 L. Ed. 2d 850, *7

taken in his judicial capacity; and (2) even though judge acted in
excess of his authority if he authorized and ratified officers'
alleged use of excessive force, such action, taken in very aid of
judge's jurisdiction over case, cannot be said to have been taken
in absence of all jurisdiction.  Mireles v Waco (1991, US) 116 L Ed
2d 9, 112 S Ct 286.

[*cases]
TABLE-OF-CASES
CASES ARE IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER GROUPED BY JURISDICTION AND LEVEL
OF      COURT

Sup Ct
  Wilkes v Dinsman (1849) 48 US 89, 12 L Ed 618: @ 3
  Randall v Brigham (1869) 74 US 523, 19 L Ed 285: @@ 3, 4, 7
Bradley v Fisher (1872) 80 US 335, 20 L Ed 646: @@ 3, 7
  Spalding v Vilas (1896) 161 US 483, 40 L Ed 780, 16 S Ct 631: @
3   Alzua v Johnson (1913) 231 US 106, 58 L Ed 142, 34 S Ct 27: @@
3, 4, 7   Pierson v Ray (1967) 386 US 547, 18 L Ed 2d 288, 87 S Ct
1213: @@ 3,      6, 7
  Imbler v Pachtman (1976) 424 US 409, 47 L Ed 2d 128, 96 S Ct 984:
@ 3   Stump v Sparkman (1978) 435 US 349, 55 L Ed 2d 331, 98 S Ct
1099: @@      3, 5-7
  Supreme Court of Virginia v Consumers Union of United States,
Inc.      (1980) 446 US 719, 64 L Ed 2d 641, 100 S Ct 1967: supp @
6   Forrester v White (1988) 484 US 219, 98 L Ed 2d 555, 108 S Ct
538,      45 BNA FEP Cas 1112, 45 CCH EPD P 37627: supp @ 5
  National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v Tarkanian (1988) 488 US 179,
    102 L Ed 2d 469, 109 S Ct 454: supp @ 5
  Mireles v Waco (1991, US) 116 L Ed 2d 9, 112 S Ct 286, 91 Daily
    Journal DAR 12907: supp @@ 3, 5-7